4EARS

Q MONTHS

cv



4. Length of sentence:

THE EX PASTO FACTO LAW BY ILLEGALLY IMPOSING
THE "UPPER TERM" WHEN THE FACTS OF THE TERM HAD
NOT BEEN DETERMINIST TO BE TRUE BY A JURY.

16. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you previously filed any petitions, applications, or motions (e.g., a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus) with respect to this judgment in the California Court of Appeal?
✓ Yes □ No

(f) Date of result (if known): _____

17.	If you	ur answer to #16 was "Yes," give the following information:				
	(a)	California Court of Appeal Case Number (if known): SWHSS 9354 4 FSB057	764			
(b) Nature of proceeding:						
(c) Names of Judges participating in case (if known)						
	(d)	Grounds raised: ARTICLE I & 9, CLAUSE 3, OF THE UNITED STATES				
		CONSTITUTION AND THE EX PASTO FACTO LAW				
		CONNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA V.S. SUPREME COURT CASE NO 05-6	551			
		Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion?				
	(f)	Result:				
		Date of result (if known):				
19.	Corp V Y	iously filed any petitions, applications, or motions (e.g., a Petition for Writ of Habeas ous) with respect to this judgment in the California Supreme Court ? es No ur answer to #18 was "Yes," give the following information:				
		California Supreme Court Case Number (if known): 5153531				
	(b)	Nature of proceeding: WRIT OF HABEITS CORDUS				
	(c)	Grounds raised: ARTICLE I & CLAUSE 3, OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE EX PASTO FACTO LAW.				
		CONNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE NO	,			
		ILLEGAL IMPOSEMENT OF THE "UPPER TERM" COS-655	(200°			
		WITHOUT THE FACTS BEING FOUND TRUE BY A JURY				
	(4)					
	(u)	Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion?				
		□ Yes ☑ No				
		Result:				

20.	If you did not file a petition, application or motion (e.g., a Petition for Review or a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus) with the <u>California Supreme Court</u> , containing the grounds raised in this federal Petition, explain briefly why you did not:
	COLLATERAL REVIEW IN FEDERAL COURT
21.	Is this your first federal petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging this conviction? Yes □ No (If "Yes" Skip to #22) (a) If no, in what federal court was the prior action filed? (i) What was the prior case number? (ii) Was the prior action (Check One): □ Denied on the merits? □ Dismissed for procedural reasons? (iii) Date of decision: (b) Were any of the issues in this current petition also raised in the prior federal petition? □ Yes □ No (c) If the prior case was denied on the merits, has the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals given you permission to file this second or successive petition? □ Yes □ No
<u>Ca</u>	UTION:
	• Exhaustion of State Court Remedies: In order to proceed in federal court you must ordinarily first exhaust your state court remedies as to each ground on which you request action by the federal court. This means that even if you have exhausted some grounds by raising them before the California Supreme Court, you must first present <i>all</i> other grounds to the California Supreme Court before raising them in your federal Petition.
	• <u>Single Petition</u> : If you fail to set forth all grounds in this Petition challenging a specific judgment, you may be barred from presenting additional grounds challenging the same judgment at a later date.
	• Factual Specificity: You must state facts, not conclusions, in support of your grounds. For

CIV 68 (Rev. Jan. 2006)

did exactly what to violate your federal constitutional rights at what time or place.

example, if you are claiming incompetence of counsel you must state facts specifically setting forth what your attorney did or failed to do. A rule of thumb to follow is — state who

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

- 22. State concisely every ground on which you claim that you are being held in violation of the constitution, law or treaties of the United States. Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. (e.g. what happened during the state proceedings that you contend resulted in a violation of the constitution, law or treaties of the United States.) If necessary, you may attach pages stating additional grounds and/or facts supporting each ground.
 - (a) GROUND ONE: UICLATION OF ARTILE I & CLAUSE 3, OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE THE "UPPER TERM" WITHOUT A ILLEGALLY IMPOSING Supporting FACTS: On SEPTEMBETL 07, 2006 AT PETITIONIETS SETUTE/VILLING, THE SCIUTENCING JUDGE ABUSED HIS AUTHORITY AND LEGAL CALIFORNIA DETERMINATE SENTENCINA ILLEGALLY IMPOSING THE "UPPER TERM" ALLEGEDIU CICLATING PFINAL FOUR YEARS ON COUNT ONE "SPOUSAL ABUSE". THE JUDGET FINDING EUNENCE OUTWIEGHED CIRCUMSTANCES IN IN AGGRAVATING MITIGATION. IN ERROR WHICH ULOCATED THE PETITIONERS AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT THE SENTENCING COURT SUPPORTING COMMINGHAM V. CALIEGEIVIA U.S. SUPPETATE COURT (ASE NO. 05-655/(2007) UNITED STATES V. BOOKER, 543 U.S. 220, 243-244 (2005) BLAKEZY V. WASHINGTON 542 U.S. 296, 304-305 (2004) V. New JERSEY, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) Did you raise GROUND ONE in the California Supreme Court? Yes | No.

If yes, answer the following:

- (1) Nature of proceeding (i.e., petition for review, habeas petition): WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
- (2) Case number or citation: <u>5 15 35 31</u>
- (3) Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order if available): DENIED

GROUND TWO: PETITIONER LEGALLY CONTEINDS THAT HIS SIXTH AMENTO
MENT RIGHT WAS VIOLATED BY COUNSEL WHEN COUNSEL USED FORCE
AND FEAR TO SIGN THE PLEA-BAKBAIN AGREEMENT IN EKKOR.
Supporting FACTS: AT PETITIONERS SENTENCING THE DENUTY
PUBLIC DEFENDER RICHARD STEPLING DID WILLFULLY,
MALICIONSLY, AND PURPOSEFULLY INSTRUCT THE PETITIONER
TO PLEAD GUILTY TO THE PLEIT-BARGAIN AGREEMENT
IN ERROR. AND WAS ILL-ADVISED BY COUNSEL TO AVOID
A JURY TRIAL AND TO NOT WASTE THE TAXPAYERS
MONEY AND THE COURTS TIME, AND ACCEPT THE PLEA-
BARGAIN OFFERED BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S DEFICE.
PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT HIS SIXTH AMENIMENT
RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING SENTENCING AND COUNSEL
COMMITTED "INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL" BY
PRESSURING PETITIONER TO SIGN THE PURA-AGREEINANT,
IN FROR DEPUTY PURIC DEFENDER VIOLATED THE
PETITIONERS SIXTH AMETUDINENT RIGHT AND POURTEE UTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT OF "DUE PROLESS".
PETITIONER IS REGUESTING THE "MID-TERM" OF
IMPRISONMENT OF THREE YEARS WITH HALF-TIME
CREDITS AND AN "AMENDMENT ARTRACT OF
SUDGEMENT " REFLECTING THIS CHANGE.
Did you raise GROUND Two in the California Supreme Court?
☐ Yes ☐ No.
If yes, answer the following:
(1) Nature of proceeding (i.e., petition for review, habeas petition): WRIT OF HABEAS CORI

Case number or citation: ___\$153531 (2)

Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order if available): DENIED (3)

Case 3:08-cv-00217-L-AJB Page 8 of 25 Document 1 Filed 02/04/2008 (c) GROUND THREE: Supporting FACTS: Did you raise GROUND THREE in the California Supreme Court? ☐ Yes ☐ No. If yes, answer the following: Nature of proceeding (i.e., petition for review, habeas petition): (1) Case number or citation: (2) Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order if available): CIV 68 (Rev. Jan. 2006) -8-

Case 3:08-cv-00217-L-AJB Document 1 Filed 02/04/2008 Page 9 of 25 GROUND FOUR: (d) Supporting FACTS: Did you raise GROUND FOUR in the California Supreme Court? ☐ Yes ☐ No. If yes, answer the following: Nature of proceeding (i.e., petition for review, habeas petition): (1) (2) Case number or citation: Result (attach a copy of the court's opinion or order if available): (3) CIV 68 (Rev. Jan. 2006) -9-

23.	ing to	ou have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal, pertain- the judgment under attack? es N No	
24.	If you	ur answer to #23 is "Yes," give the following information:	
	(a)	Name of Court:	
	(b)	Case Number:	
	(c)	Case Number: Date action filed:	
		Nature of proceeding:	
	(e)	Name(s) of judges (if known):	
	(f)	Grounds raised:	
			,
	(g)	Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? ☐ Yes ☐ No	
25.	stage	the name and address, if known, of each attorney who represented you in the following es of the judgment attacked herein: At preliminary hearing:	
	(b)	At arraignment and plea: RICHARD STERLING PUBLIC DEFENDER SAN BEKNARDIND SUPERIOR COURT, 350 N. ARROWHEND AUG BE	ATO WWATENING
	(c)	At trial:	
	(d)	At sentencing: RICHARD STERLING DEFENDER SAN BERNARDINO SUPERIOR COURT, 350 N. ARROWHERD AND BE	H-2()
	(e)	On appeal:	
		In any post-conviction proceeding:	
	(g)	On appeal from any adverse ruling in a post-conviction proceeding:	

above.

matters and trial in this case.

29. Date you are mailing (or handing to	a correctional officer) this Petition to this court:
Wherefore, Petitioner prays that the Coproceeding.	urt grant Petitioner relief to which he may be entitled in this
	SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY (IF ANY)
I declare under penalty of perjury that the	he foregoing is true and correct. Executed on
JAYUUARY (19, 2000) (DATE)	SIGNATURE OF PETITIONER

COURT OF APPEAL -- STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

ORDER

COURT OF APPEAL FOURTH DISTRICT

In re WILLIAM L. BOULDIN, JR.,

E043053

on Habeas Corpus.

(Super.Ct.Nos. SWHSS9354 & FSB057764)

The County of San Bernardino

THE COURT

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

Acting P.J.

See attached list cc:

Case 3:08-cv-00217-L-AJB | Document 1 | Filed 02/04/2008, Page 14 # 25:

EXELBIT

A

Exhibit a

ARGUMENT

POINT ONE: CALIFORNIA LAW MANDATES IMPOSING THE MID-TERM SENTENCE AND CONCURRENT SENTENCES UNLESS OTHER FACTORS REQUIRE OTHERWISE; ACCORDINGLY, THESE STATUTORY

SCHEMES VIOLATES THE HOLDING IN BLAKELY VS.

WASHINGTON IN THAT THEY FAIL TO REQUIRE THE ADDITIONAL FACTORS TO BE FOUND TO BE TRUE BY A JURY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

A. Blakely

In <u>Blakely v. Washington</u> (No. 02-1632, decided June 24, 2004) ____U.S. ____, 2004 D.J.D.A.R. 7581, 2004 WL 1402697, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4573)(<u>Blakely</u>), the Court considered the validity of Washington's statutory sentencing scheme, in which the judge is permitted to impose an "exceptional" sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, based on additional facts found by the judge, not the jury. In <u>Blakely</u>, the defendant pleaded guilty to kidnaping his estranged wife. The facts admitted in his plea supported a maximum sentence of 53 months. After a separate (non jury) sentencing hearing, the trial judge found that the defendant acted with "deliberate cruelty." Based on that aggravating factor, the judge imposed a total sentence of 90 months.

In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed. Relying on its prior

435 (Apprendi), the Court held that the judge could not increase Blakely's sentence based on his finding of "deliberate cruelty," because the facts supporting that finding were not admitted by Blakely or found to be true by a jury. (Blakely v. Washington, supra, U.S.___, 2004U.S. Lexis 4573 at pp.10-17, 31-32).

In reaching this conclusion, the court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Apprendi, holding the Sixth Amendment requires any fact, other than a prior conviction, which increases a defendant's punishment beyond the statutory maximum to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Blakely v. Washington, supra, __U.S.__, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4537 at pp.10-13, 16-17). Because Washington's sentencing procedure did not comply with the Sixth Amendment, the court held Blakely's sentence is invalid. (Blakely v. Washington, supra, __U.S.__, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4537 at p. 17).

The Court also addressed the circumstances in which a sentence exceeds the "statutory maximum," requiring factual findings by a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court defined the "statutory maximum" as "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." (Blakely v. Washington, supra, ___U.S.___, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4573 at p.13-15, citing Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556).

In other words, the relevant "statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts [to support a sentence enhancement], but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the

jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts "which the law makes essential to the punishment," [citation omitted], and the judge exceeds his proper authority.

(Blakely v. Washington, supra, ___U.S. ____; 2004 U.S. Lexis at p. 14).

In summary, Blakely holds that aggravating factors which are to be used to increase a sentence must be presented to the jury for its consideration. "As Apprendi held, every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment." (Blakely v. Washington, supra, ___U.S. ___, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4573 at p. 31; emphasis in original). If Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part: (b) When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall order imposition of the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime..... In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the upper or lower term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other reports ... and statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution, the defendant, or the victim, or the family of the victim if the victim is deceased, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing. The court the jury does not find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that those facts exist, the judge may not use them to increase a sentence, and sentencing procedures which do not meet these requirements violate the Sixth Amendment.

Blakely applies to all cases in which the direct appeal is still pending. (Schriro v.

Summerlin (No. 03-526, decided June 24, 2004) U.S., 2004 D.J. D.A.R. 7569, 2004 WL 1402732, 2004 Lexis U.S. 4574 at p. 7 ["When a decision of this Court results in a 'new rule,' the rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review"]; Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649).

B. The California Sentencing Scheme

1. Selection of Upper Term

As relevant here, California's determinate sentencing scheme, as set forth in Penal Code section 11701 and California Rules of Court rules 4.420, shall set forth on the record the facts and reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. . . (Penal Code, § 1170, subd. (b)). 2 Rule 4.420 of the California Rules of Court provides in pertinent part: (a) The middle term shall be selected unless imposition of the upper or lower term is justified by circumstances in aggravation or mitigation. (b) Circumstances in aggravation shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Selection of the upper term is justified only if, after a consideration of all the relevant facts, the circumstances in aggravation outweigh the circumstances in mitigation. The relevant facts are included in the case record, the probation officer's report, other reports and statements properly received, statements in aggravation or mitigation, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing. . . (d) A fact that is an element of the crime shall not be used to impose the upper term. (e) The reasons for selecting the upper or lower term shall be stated orally on the record, and shall include a concise statement of the ultimate facts which the

Case 3:08-cv-00217-L-AJB Docum

court deemed to constitute circumstances in aggravation or mitigation justifying the term selected. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420 (a), (b), (d), (e); emphasis added).et seq.,2 permits the sentencing judge to select from among the lower, middle, and upper terms prescribed by statute for a particular offense. The term of imprisonment that may be imposed based solely on the jury's verdict is the middle term. The judge may not impose the upper term unless he finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there are additional aggravating factors, which outweigh any mitigating factors. (Penal Code, §.1170, subd. (b), Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(b)). The judge may base these findings on matters not presented to the jury (e.g., probation reports); (Penal Code, § 1170, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(b)). In addition, a fact which is an element of the crime cannot be used to impose the upper term. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(d)). This statutory scheme does not require aggravating factors be found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury. Rather, such findings are made solely by the trial judge based upon a preponderance of the evidence and may be based on material that the jury never considered (e.g., probation reports). Moreover, by virtue of rule 4.420, subdivision (d), the judge is specifically prohibited from imposing the upper term based on any elements of the underlying offense; the very things that the jury unanimously found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. California's sentencing scheme is highly similar to the sentencing procedures found invalid in Blakely. Under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act, a judge may impose a sentence above the standard range only if he "substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence."

. (Wash.Rev.Code, § 9.94A.535, formerly, § 9.94A.120(2)).

Similarly, in California, the upper term of imprisonment may be imposed only if the judge finds one or more aggravating factors. (Penal Code, § 1170, subd. (b), Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420 (b)). The Washington Act lists aggravating factors that justify such a departure, which are strikingly similar to the aggravating factors listed in rule 4.423 of the California Rules of Court. (Compare Wash.Rev.Code, § 9.94A.535, formerly, § 9.94A.390, with Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423). However, "[a] reason offered to justify an exceptional sentence can be considered only if it takes into account factors other than those which are used in computing the standard range sentence for the offense." (State v. Gore (2001) 143 Wash.2d 288, 315-316, 21 P.3d 262, 277). Similarly, in California, the upper term may not be imposed based on a fact which is also an element of the offense. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(d)). Under the Washington Act, when a judge imposes an exceptional sentence, he must set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting it (Wash.Rev.Code, § 9.94A.535, formerly, § 9.94A.120(3)); in California, a judge who selects the upper term must state his reasons for doing so on the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(e)).

Thus in all pertinent respects, California's sentencing scheme suffers from the same defects as the Washington scheme that the Court struck down in Blakely.

2. Consecutive Sentences

California's sentencing laws also permit the trial judge to impose consecutive sentences, Penal Code section 669 provides in pertinent part: (a) When any person is convicted of two or more crimes.

whether in the same proceeding or court or in different proceedings or courts, and whether by judgment rendered by the same judge or by different judges, the second or other subsequent judgment upon which sentence in ordered to be executed shall direct whether the terms of imprisonment or any of them to which he or she is sentenced shall run concurrently or consecutively. . . . Upon the failure of the court to determine how the terms of imprisonment on the second or subsequent judgment shall run, the term of imprisonment on the second or subsequent judgment shall run concurrently. . . (Penal Code, § 669). 4California Rules of Court, rule 4.425 states: Criteria affecting the decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences include: (a) [Criteria relating to crimes] Facts relating to the crimes, including whether or not: (1) The crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other. (2) The crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence. (3) The crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior. increased punishment, in the form of consecutive sentences, based on facts not submitted to or found to be true by a jury. Penal Code section 669 provides that in the absence of special findings by the trial judge, sentences for two or more felonies shall run concurrently. 3 The rule implementing this statute is California Rules of Court, rule

4.4254, which specifies the criteria for determining whether to sentence consecutively or concurrently. Thus, in order to sentence consecutively rather than concurrently, the trial judge has to find one or more of the factors listed in rule 4.425. None of these factors is presented to or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury. Indeed, rule 4.425 expressly prohibits the use of facts found by the jury, such as elements of the offense and facts supporting enhancements, in the decision to impose consecutive sentences. (Cal.Rules of Court, rule 4.425(b)).

Consecutive sentencing under these provisions permits the trial judge, alone, to increase the defendant's punishment based on facts beyond those found by the jury verdict.

For these reasons, the consecutive sentencing scheme in California also fails the Apprenditest as explained in Blakely and thus violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

Appellant is mindful that Division Five of this Court recently filed an opinion holding that Blakely does not apply to consecutive sentences. (See People vs. Sikes, Case Number: B 168042, certified for partial publication, filed July 27, 2004.) Appellant respectfully disagrees with that panel's analysis. It simply concludes that our consecutive sentencing scheme passes the Apprendi test. The opinion, however, does not adequately respond to the analysis given here.

Additionally, as food for thought, this Court must consider the fact that the California Supreme Court has recently granted hearings on two cases which involve Blakely issues. The opinions are not published. We are not attempting to use them here as precedent but merely

refer to them to illustrate the fact that hearings have been granted. (See <u>People vs. Towne</u>, Supreme Court Case Number: S125677, Rev. Granted 6/14/04 and <u>People vs. Black</u>, Supreme Court Case Number: S 126182, Rev. Granted 7/28/04)

Accordingly, it is not far fetched to believe that another Court may find the consecutive sentencing scheme to constitutionally infirm. Counsel would be remiss in his duty by failing to raise these issues.

The statutory scheme used to sentence Appellant to a high base term and to make all of his enhancements run consecutively do not require the additional factors be found to be true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for resentencing.

WHEREFORE, appellant prays for judgment that:

(1) the judgment of the trial court be reversed; and,

(2) For General Relief

DATED.

63 JAN/124, 2008

By William 2 Bailoto

JS44

(Rev. 07/89)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS-44 civil cover sheet and the rules of court. This form, approviated. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS Control of the PLAINTIFFS)	eptember 354	the filing and service of plea 19/4, is required for the us 1983 GPEE PAID	adings or ot se of the CI	her papers as required by let of Court for the purpos	of its time are all ocket			
Willian	3 L	No	Mich		(, U.S. DISTRICT COURT			
(b) COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED San Rernardino PLAINTIFF (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)				TY OF USIDENCE OF I	CASES O	TED DEFE RY ANT	DISTRICT OF CALIFORN DEPU	
(c) ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAM	IE, ADDRESS, AND TELEPH	ONE NUMBER)	ATTOR	NEYS (IF KNOWN)	-			
William Leon Bouldin, Jr. F-43339 California Institution For Men PO Box 600 Chino Hills, CA 91708-0600				208 CV 0217 L AJB				
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION		ONLY)			PAL PART	TIES (PLACE AN X IN O		
□ 1U.S. Government Plaintiff				(For Diversity Cases Only) FOR PLAINTIFF AND ONE BOX FOR DEFE PT DEF Citizen of This State Incorporated or Principal Place of Business in This State				
☐ 2U.S. Government Defendant	t	tizenship of Parties in		Citizen of Another State \square_2 \square_2 Incorporated and Principal Place of Business \square_5 \square_5 Citizen or Subject of a Foreign \square_3 \square_4 Foreign Nation \square_6 \square_6				
			Country		□ ₃ □ ₃			
IV. CAUSE OF ACTION (CIT JURISDICTIONAL STATUTI				FILING AND WRITE A E	BRIEF STA	TEMENT OF CAUSE.	DO NOT CITE	
V. NATURE OF SUIT (PLAC	Y					DANKRUPTCV	OTHER STATUTES	
CONTRACT	PERSONAL INJURY	PERSONAL INJ	URY	FORFEITURE/PENALT		BANKRUPTCY		
☐ 110 Insurance ☐ Marine	310 Airplane	362 Personal Injury-		610 Agriculture 620 Other Food & Drug	L	22 Appeal 28 USC 158 23 Withdrawal 28 USC 157	400 State Reappointment 410 Antitrust	
Miller Act	315 Airplane Product Liability	Medical Malpractice		625 Drug Related Seizure		PROPERTY RIGHTS	430 Banks and Banking	
☐ Negotiable Instrument	320 Assault, Libel & Slander	365 Personal Injury -		of Property 21 USC881	□ s:	20 Copyrights	450 Commerce/ICC Rates/etc.	
150 Recovery of Overpayment &Enforcement of Judgment	330 Federal Employers' Liability	Product Liability 368 Asbestos Personal Product Liability	Injury	630 Liquor Laws 640 RR & Truck		30 Patent 40 Trademark SOCIAL SECURITY	460 Deportation 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations	
☐ 151 Medicare Act ☐ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student	☐ 340 Marine ☐ 345 Marine Product	DEDCOMAL DOOR		650 Airline Regs 660 Occupational Safety/He	П.	61 HIA (13958)	810 Selective Service	
Loans (Excl. Veterans)	Liability	370 Other Fraud		690 Other		62 Black Lung (923)	850 Securities/Commodities	
☐ 153Recovery of Overpayment	350 Motor Vehicle	371 Truth in Lending		LABOR		63 DIWC/DIWW (405(g))	Exchange	
of Veterans Benefits	355 Motor Vehicle Product	380 Other Personal		710Fair Labor Standards Ac	cı 🗅 8	64 SSID Title XVI	875 Customer Challenge 12 USC	
160 Stockholders Suits	Liability 	ility Property Damage		720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations		65 RSI (405(g)) FEDERAL TAX SUITS	891 Agricultural Acts	
Other Contract	360 Other Personal Injury	ersonal Injury 385 Property Damage Product Liability		☐ 730 Labor/Mgmt. Reporting Disclosure Act			892 Economic Stabilization Act 893 Environmental Matters	
195 Contract Product Liability REAL PROPERTY	CIVIL RIGHTS			NONE -		70 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff r Defendant)	894 Energy Allocation Act	
210 Land Condemnation	441 Voting	510 Motions to Vacate	Sentence	740 Railway Labor Act	Ь.	71 IRS - Third Party	895 Freedom of Information Act	
220 Foreclosure	442 Employment Habeas Corpus			791 Empl. Ret. Inc.		6 USC 7609	900 Appeal of Fee Determination Under Equal Access to Justice	
230 Rent Lease & Electmant	443 Housing/Accommodations	⊠ 530 General		Security Act			L	
240 Tort to Land	240 Tort to Land 444 Welfare 535 Death Penalty						950 Constitutionality of State	
		540 Mandamus & Othe	er				☐ 890 Other Statutory Actions	
290 All Other Real Property	N ONE BOY ON 10	550 Civil Rights		_ 				
VI. ORIGIN (PLACE AN X II ☑ 1 Original Proceeding ☐ 2 R State	Removal from		Reinstated	☐5 Transferred from			7 Appeal to District Judge from	
VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: □ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS COMPLAINT: □ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS JURY DEMAND: □ YES □ NO								
	ACTION UNDER f.r.c.p.			<u></u>		Docket Number	: - 1E2 - NO	
VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF		10GE		-SIGNATURE OF ATTO	ORNEY OF			
DATE 2/4/0	8 4 14:	7219 In 185,-		PPC				
R	114100 A	n B),						

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO DIVISION

147219 - SR

February 04, 2008 16:29:31

Habeas Corpus

USAO #.: 08CV0217 HABEAS Judge..: M. JAMES LORENZ

Amount.:

Check#.: 93426745612

\$5.00 MO

Total-> \$5.00

FROM: BOULDIN V. POULOS

HABEAS